The dream that failed
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The decline and fall of the communist state has left many ecstatic and many others bewildered. East Europe's former ruling parties have moved so far away from communist ideology that they know shun the hammer-and-sickle symbol and prefer terms like socialism and social democracy.
In this article, B.R.P. BHASKAR, who visited
the Soviet Union and East Europe recently, analyses the factors that led to the
collapse of communism which its adherents believed was destined to win.
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As the First World War was raging in Europe, Vladimir Lenin shook the world by establishing the first communist state on earth. As the Second World War ended, many more countries came under the communist banner. And the new world order promised by the prophets of communism appeared to be within reach.
Gradually, however, the communist dream started
fading. One by one, East Europe’s communist states fell last year, burying
under their debris the vision of a casteless society.
With the Soviet Union and China too moving along the
path of reform, communism, as preached and practiced for decades, is fast
disappearing. While those who were associated with the communist movement in
the days of its ascendancy are struggling to come to terms with the new
reality, its critics are clearly ecstatic. Neither side appears to be making an
objective appraisal of how the hope of the masses turned into the despair of
millions.
A close look at recent developments in East Europe
will help understand the factors that led to the decline and fall of the
communist state.
Poland was the first to move away from the communist
path. Here, all through the years of communist rule, nationalist sentiments had
been sustained by the Catholic Church. The Solidarity trade union, which took
birth in the ship-building yard at Gdansk, built up a strong anti-communist
movement in the early 80’s.
As far back as 1981 it was evident that the people
were with Solidarity, and not the Polish United Workers Party, which was the official
name of the communist party. At that time Solidarity had a membership of nine
million in a population of 40 million. The PUWP membership was only one
million. Nevertheless, the PUWP stayed put, not being bound by the democratic
practice of allowing the majority party to rule. The PUWP regime resorted to
martial law to enforce its authority.
By 1989 Solidarity had weakened considerably. At
that stage the PUWP relented. It called a general election in which, for the
first time in a communist set-up, voters were given the opportunity to choose
their representatives freely for a limited number of seats.
The seats thrown open for free choice were
so few that the PUWP reckoned it could retain power with the help of the
Democratic Party and the Peasants Party, its long-time coalition partners.
Its calculations went wrong when Solidarity, after
making a clean sweep of all open seats, won over the Democratic Party and the
Peasants Party to its side. Reduced to a minority, the best the PUWP could do was
to settle down to being a minor partner in a Solidarity-led government.
Soon afterwards, the PUWP bade good-bye to
communism. It took on a new identity as the Social Democratic Party.
In Hungary, the Communist Party threw out its
hard-line leadership, renamed itself the Hungarian Socialist Party and ordered
multi-party elections. A small group of communists who did not approve of the
change decided to keep the old party going.
Like Hungary, Bulgaria too witnessed a peaceful
transition. The Bulgarian Communist Party ousted the long-reigning strongman
Todor Zhivkov, converted itself into the Bulgarian Socialist Party and set a
date for free elections.
Where the ruling parties refused to change, brief
popular movements, which sometimes turned violent, brought down the
governments, paving the way for elections. The East German Workers Party became
the Party of Democratic Socialism. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
yielded power to a hastily assembled coalition of pro-democracy groups. Somehow
it missed the chance to assume a new identity, but it was made known that it
had given up faith in such concepts as democratic centralism and dictatorship
of the proletariat.
The communist parties of East Europe not only
jettisoned the ideological baggage but also adopted new symbols in their
desperate bid to project a new image. The familiar hammer-and-sickle symbol of
working class unity is shunned by many of them now. Czechoslovakia’s communists, while retaining the
party’s name, have adopted a new symbol – the cherry tree. The Bulgarian
Communist Party, rechristened the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has the red rose
as its symbol.
The changes in East Europe were a direct consequence
of the reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. His twin
programmes of glasnost and perestroika eroded two basic features of the
communist state: extreme secrecy and rigid central control. These features which brought discredit to communism
are now denounced without exception by the East European parties which worked the
system for decades. They attribute these features to the distortion of
communism under Josef Stalin.
Not long after Stalin’s death, Nikita Khrushchev had
repudiated his legacy. But the system was too well entrenched ti be reformed
easily. Thus, while Stalin stood discredited, Stalinism survived. Outside the
Soviet Union Stalin continued to have ardent followers.
The fall of the communist governments in quick
succession is generally explained in terms of the domino effect. However,
according to a theory advanced by some East European observers, the changes
were not merely inspired by Gorbachev but actually instigated by Moscow. The proponents of this theory hold that where the
communist parties did not replace the Stalinist leadership voluntarily,
anti-government movements were engineered by the Soviet secret police (KGB)
with the help of its local counterparts. In some instances, it is said, the
movements went out of their control.
This theory gained so much currency in
Czechoslovakia that the new regime there ordered a judicial inquiry into the
role of the secret police in fomenting trouble. The findings of the inquiry
have not been released so far.
It must be noted that even those communist states
which were not aligned with the Soviet Union have witnessed changes.
Yugoslavia, which had broken with Moscow a long time ago to strike out an
independent socialist path, has also opted for a multi-party system. Albania,
plodding a lonely furrow after having been a camp-follower of China for many
years, has announced a programme of limited economic and political reforms.
It is not as if the changes now sweeping the
communist world started with Gorbachev. Even before he arrived on the scene,
China had embarked upon a programme of economic reform which took it away from the
traditional communist path. Under Deng Ziaopong’s leadership, the Communist
Party of China not only allowed private enterprise but threw open large areas
of the country to foreign capital. The new thinking of the Chinese communist leadership
was voiced by the then party General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, at the party
congress in 1988 when he said that absolute egalitarianism was neither
desirable nor practical, and some people should be helped to become rich first.
There is an important difference between the current
Soviet and Chinese situations. The Soviet Union, while moving hesitantly on the
economic front, has made much progress on the political front. In fact, over
the past five years, Gorbachev has quietly shifted effective power from the
Communist Party to the state. The KGB, for instance, is now under the
government, not under the party. Party functionaries who exercised political power at
various levels are all still there, but the functions performed by them have
been taken away and entrusted to government departments.
China, on the other hand, has moved forward on the
economic front without attempting serious political reform. Over the past
decade, as a result of the policy initiated by Deng, sections of the people
have attained a new level of prosperioty. But the Communist Party continues to
have a vice-like grip on all aspects of Chinese life.
The situation in neither country is conducive to
long-term stability. When political and economic changes do not keep pace with
each other the results can be disastrous. The ultimate test of political progress is the
extent to which it helps in meeting the economic needs of the people.
Persistent economic discontent is certain to result in political unrest. That
is the problem the Soviet Union is facing. New forces generated by economic changes inevitably
seek opportunities for political expression. If the political system does not
accommodate these forces, it is bound to come under strain. This is the problem
that China is facing.
The sweeping changes in the communist world have
naturally enthused Western observers who view them as vindication of their
views on the evils of Marxism. The popular mood in East Europe is one of
euphoria over the newly-won freedom. Communist spokesmen readily acknowledge
that their regimes had failed.
Why did communism, which its adherents believed was
destined to win, collapse like a house of cards? Why have parties which made
communism their guiding principle turned against it so much that they are
unwilling to use the term “communist” today, preferring instead labels like
social democracy or democratic socialism? Before proceeding to answer these questions, it is
perhaps necessary to examine some of the assumptions behind them. Were the
communist states in fact practising communism? Were the ruling parties in the
communist parties really committed to communist ideology?
Karl Marx envisaged communism as a new stage in the
evolution of human society. He saw it as a stage that lay beyond capitalism,
which was still growing in his time. Czarist Russia was not yet a developed
capitalist society when Lenin steered the Bolshevik movement to victory, taking
advantage of conditions favourable to a revolution. He interpreted Marx’s
theories to suit his needs.
Years later, Mao Zedong similarly staged a
successful revolution in a country that had barely emerged from the shadow of
feudalism. He interpreted Marx and Lenin to suit his situation. While communists seized power in countries which did
not fulfil the criteria laid down by Marx, those where capitalism flourished
and which were thus, in theory, ready for revolution somehow missed the
proletarian revolution they were told to expect.
Marx conceived communist society as a
self-regulating social organism in which the state having no further role to
play as an instrument of oppression will wither away. The communist rulers did
not build such a society. It remained a distant goal throughout. In the meantime, the communist state, far from
showing signs of withering away, grew into an even more powerful instrument of
oppression. At the hands of his devout followers, Marx suffered
the fate that had befallen many religious teachers before him: his teachings
were distorted in practice even as he was deified.
In considering the developments in East Europe, it
is pertinent to remember that the communist parties triumphed in the region not
as a result of a revolutionary upsurge but as a fallout of the Soviet Union’s
emergence as the dominant power of the region.
There is irony in the choice of new labels by the
communist parties. At the turn of the century social democratic parties were
gaining strength on Europe. These parties, which endeavoured to combine the
virtues of liberal democracy and social justice, appeared to be harbingers of a
new era. In several countries, including Russia, communists
functioned within the framework of social democratic parties.
In the inter-War period, the social democratic
parties and peasants’ parties which championed the cause of farmers were forces
to reckon with. In many countries they were vying with the communist parties
for supremacy. Gradually, both groups were overshadowed by fascist
elements who emerged on top by deftly exploiting the popular disenchantment
resulting from the failure of democratic institutions to cope effectively with
the worsening economic situation.
After the Second World War, the social democratic
parties and the peasants’ parties rose again. However, the Soviet Union could
get them to provide the communist parties a larger share in coalition governments
than was warranted by their size or influence. In a matter of two or three
years the communists grabbed the leadership of the coalition.
Thus, in East Europe, communist power grew out of
the barrels of Soviet guns. Tito’sYugoslavia, which was not indebted to the
Soviet army for freedom from Nazi occupation to the same extent as its
neighbours, could break away from Moscow’s control. But when Hungary and
Czechoslovakia tried to take the same road, the Soviets did not hesitate to use
their tanks.
As the communist parties grew in the shadow of the
Soviet Union they absorbed the social democratic parties, mostly through forced
mergers. Today, the reborn communist parties, in their quest for a new
identity, find it most convenient to adopt the socialist or social democratic
label because their new objectives are no different from those of the old
social democratic parties.
Both the Soviets and the Chinese are at pains to
project the changes under way in their countries as a process of socialist
renewal. But there is no denying the fact that there has been a change in
direction.
It will, however, be wrong to equate their new-found
interest in the virtues of the free market with willingness to accept the
capitalist system. So far as the Soviet Union and East Europe are concerned,
the current ideal is the Scandinavian welfare state.
Some Soviet academics, while remaining in the
Communist Party, have started describing themselves as social democrats. In the era of virtual one-party rule, many sported
the communist badge because it was an invaluable aid for advancement in any
walk of life. For those who wished to take part in public life, communist party
membership offered the best prospects. When the party fell on evil days, there was
naturally a sharp drop in membership. Careerists and opportunists no loger have
any use for the party.
Commenting on the swift disintegration of the Polish
party after transfer of power, a Solidarity spokesman said: “They were never
communists. That was why it was easy for them to shed their old identity and
take a new one.”
In the Soviet Union, where the struggle for a new
identity is still on, a large section of party members is reported to have
become inactive since the emergence of distinct ideological groups. But some
communist parties, especially those of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, claim that
they are attracting new members, mostly youths, to offset partly the loss of
old cadres. Since these people have chosen to throw in their lot with the party
at a time of adversity the leadership considers the future bright.
Significantly, in the elections in Czechoslovakia,
the Communist Party, performing better than expected, collected nearly 15 per
cent of the votes polled. In Bulgaria, the communists, fighting under the
Socialist Party banner, managed to retain power.
To the extent the communist system of economic
management has been shown up as inefficient, it is inevitable that the
communist-ruled countries should want to switch to a free market economy. But
it remains to be seen how far the free market system can help them. A free
market by itself does not guarantee economic progress. If the free market system too fails to fulfil the
economic asporations of the people, there is bound to be a backlash. It is difficult
to foresee at this stage who will benefit by such a development – socialists or
fascists.
As unemployment soars under the new dispensation, a
nostalgia for the good old days may develop at least in those at the worse end
of the stick. At that stage the beneficial aspects of socialism, which are now
overlooked in the anxiety to get rid of its harsh aspects, may be appreciated
better. It is then that a genuine social democratic movement can hope to
succeed.
This
article, and the companion piece below, appeared in the Deccan Herald,
Bangalore, on Sunday, July 15, 1990.
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‘It’s
communism vs consumerism’
The dominant impression in my mind after visiting
the Soviet Union and several East European countries and discussing recent
developments with communist party spokesmen is that many are too dazed by the
pace of events to make a realistic appraisal.
Asked what brought about the collapse of the
communist regime, the official spokesman of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia responded with disarming frankness: “That is what I would like
to know myself.”
His deputy hypothesized that the Communist Party had
tried to realize real socialism, as distinct from the democratic socialism of
the Socialist International. In the process, he said, real socialism was distorted.
He added: “It is necessary to study this as a false way of socialism.”
The spokesman of the Polish Social Democratic Party
said: “Communism is a beautiful dream. Our mistake was to have imagined we
could realize it.”
Sergei B. Stankevich, a young People’s Deputy of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR and scholar attached to the Institute of Universal
History under the USSR Academy of Sciences, said socialism was a historical
trend, not a social system.”
“Where did communism go wrong – in theory or in
practice?” I asked him.
“In both,” Stankevich replied. To begin with, he said,
there were mistakes in theory. He identified the failure to create new modes of
production as one of the major weaknesses of the system practised in the Soviet
Union.
Stankevich said there was a wide gap between theory
and practice. When this became obvious, the leadership failed to face it with a
sense of realism. Instead, it erected artificial structures to hide the
situation.
“All artificial constructions are roads to disaster,”
he said.
Marxists can take comfort in the fact that economic
factors were the determinants in the critical situation that developed in the
communist world.
Communism lost not to capitalism as such, but to
consumerism which was spawned by capitalism. Strange as it may seem, communism,
which in theory is based on scientific principles, proved less efficient than
capitalism in coping with the needs of a changing world.
Consequently, while the communists waited for
capitalism to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions, their own
house crumbled over their heads.
In capitalist societies, democratic pluralism
provided outlets for popular discontent to manifest itself. In communist
societies, where such outlets were lacking,discontent kept mounting, and the
options before the state were to suppress it or to surrender. For long, the
state suppressed it; then it surrendered.
---BRPB
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